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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court,
Respondent Cache Valley Dairy Association (Cache Valley) hereby
petitions the Court for rehearing upon the grounds that the
majority opinion appears to have overlooked or misapprehended
certain noncontested and indisputable facts and arrived at two
erroneous conclusions:

(1) the majority opinion erroneously

states that Plaintiff

sued Defendant for "damages" allegedly

sustained as a result of Lir termination and remands the case for
"proceedings consistent with this opinion," apparently including
an assessment of damages; and (2) the majority opinion totally
misapprehends the nature of the May 2 6th

resolution and asserts

that under that resolution Idaho producers could be assessed a
two percent levy while Utah producers paid only a one percent assessment.

—
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Moreover, the majority's analysis of Cache Valley's right to

.terminate the Plaintiff's association with Cache Valley fails to
.distinguish

between the Plaintiff's

"milk producer"
established

impression

and thus misapprehends

distinction

cases have been

status as a

in

cooperative

found this case

a

"member" and

fundamental

law.

Since

appears to be

in the area of state cooperative

and
no

a case

law.

a

well-

similar
of

Cache

first
Valley

would respectfully urge the Court to grant rehearing so that the
opinion receives the benefit of a full adjudication
in view

of

the

certain

facts

fact

the

Court

which

are

not

appears

to

have

disputed

by

the

particularly

misapprehended
Appellant

and

Respondent.
: : ,e '

POINT O N E \...;-,;.;;.

THE PLAINTIFF SOUGHT ONLY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THUS
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT PLAINTIFF
SOUGHT
DAMAGES AND IN REMANDING THE CASE ON THAT BASIS.
The first paragraph of the majority opinion asserts that the
Plaintiff sued Cache Valley for "damages allegedly sustained as a
result of his termination
Association]."

Plaintiff

[as a member of the Cache Valley Dairy
did

not

seek

damages

in

either

his

original or amended complaints; rather the Plaintiff sought only
injunctive relief and reinstatement of the Plaintiff in the Cache
Valley Dairy Association. 1

t

1

In the prayer for relief of both the original complaint dated July 30,
1982, (pages 5 and 6), and the amended verified complaint dated November 3, 1982,
the Plaintiff has requested only declaratory relief, no ad damnum or other reference
to damages exits.

2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The majority opinion remands the matter to the district
court for "proceedings consistent" with the opinion.
erroneous

assumption

that

the

Plaintiff

sought

If the

damages

is

accepted, such "proceedings" would arguably include an assessment
and

award

proved.

of damages that the Plaintiff neither sought nor
Thus, the majority's misapprehension of the type of

relief sought by the Plaintiff has led to a factually flawed
decision

and has

increased the risk

faced by

Cache Valley.

Indeed, as explained further in the "Suggestion of Mootness,"
filed separately on this date, the issue of the Plaintiff's
entitlement to the injunctive relief sought is now moot because
the Plaintiff has left the Dairy business altogether to teach
school in Arizona.
POINT TWO
THE MAJORITYfS ASSERTION THAT THE MAY 26TH RESOLUTION
EFFECTIVELY LEVIES A TWO PERCENT ASSESSMENT ON IDAHO
MEMBERS AND A ONE PERCENT ASSESSMENT ON UTAH MEMBERS IS
ERRONEOUS AND IF LEFT UNCORRECTED COULD RESULT IN
SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO CACHE VALLEY.
The May 26th resolution provides:
(1) Paying the assessment imposed on the sale of
milk as provided by Section 4-22-7 U.C.A. 1953 as
amended, wherein such funds are used by the Utah Dairy
Commission to promote the sale and advertising of dairy
products; or

3
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(2) Any members who elect to have the 1% refunded ~
to them pursuant to the foregoing statute as authorized
by state law, then such member shall be required to
deposit said refund or the equivalent thereof and pay
thejsame to the Cache Valley Dairy Association for the
Association to use in its sales promotions and
advertising of its dairy products which are marketed by
the Association.
Any member of this Association who refuses to
pay the assessment for advertising and sales promotion
as set forth above, shall be deemed to be a noncooperator and their membership may be terminated at
the election of the Board of Directors.
The majority opinion asserts that the Plaintiff claimed the

assessment
stating

was

"the

not uniform
resolution

and

concurs

effectively

with

levies

the
a

Plaintiff,

two

percent

assessment on Idaho members and a one percent assessment on Utah
members."
no.

Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, slip. op.

19204

at

6

(December

1,

1987) .

In

reaching

those

conclusions, the majority has ignored the fact that the issue of
inequality was never raised by the Plaintiff on appeal and has
misapprehended the function of the May 2 6th resolution.
^

The |May 26th resolution was designed to create a parity

between Utah and Idaho members.

Utah law provides a one percent

assessment on the sale of milk to provide revenue for use in
financing Utah Dairy Commission promotions.
§4-22-7.

See Utah Code Ann.

Idaho law also imposes a one percent assessment for use

by the Idaho Dairy Commission in sponsoring promotion.
Code §25-3117.

See Idaho

Unlike Idaho law, however, Utah statutes allow

milk producers to opt out of the levy and claim a refund.
Utah Code Ann. 214-22-7(4).
4
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See

Thus, if state law alone determined the issue, Idaho members
would pay a mandatory one percent assessment while Utah members
could choose not to pay the assessment imposed by Utah law (by
requesting a refund) .

The undisputed intent of the May 26th

resolution was to equalize the position of Utah and Idaho members
by requiring Utah members to return to Cache Valley any refunds
they

received

from

the

state

for

use

in

Cache

promotional efforts.

Valley's

i

At no point has it ever been maintained either by the
Appellant or by the Respondent that the Idaho producers were not
receiving credit for their state mandated assessment.

This is

the primary reason why this case has reached the Court since the
May 2 6th resolution was adopted to maintain equality in the
organization between the Idaho producers and the Utah producers.
The factual conclusion that the May 26th resolution results in a
two (2%) percent assessment to the Idaho producers should not
have been addressed on appeal as this was never raised by the
Appellant in the either the trial court below, or in his briefs
to the Supreme Court, is not essential to a resolution of the
case and in fact ignores what in reality has been the practice of
the Association.
i
j

i
•

:

.

:

•

'

.

:

i

: • • : . . .

t
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-This erroneous conclusion can only give the Idaho producers
the impression that all the Utah producers,

(not merely the

handful who requested a refund) are not paying their fair share
thus creating further disharmony and discord among the interstate
membership cf the Cooperative.
It is respectively urged that the majority withdraw any and
all reference to a two percent assessment to the Idaho producers
as the effect of this on long term relationships with the Idaho
members is extremely damaging, is not in practice correct (and
was never questioned until now) and is not necessary to reach the
ultimate results which the majority opinion decides.
If

the

Court

desires

to

reverse

the

trial

court, the

majority opinion under Part III of its opinion provides adequate
basis for holding for Plaintiff.
unnecessarily

do

violence

to

By doing this, it will not
the

Cooperative's

Board

of

Directors1 efforts in attempting to maintain equality between the
Idaho and the Utah producer members of the Association.
Cache Valley respectfully requests that the Court rehear
this matter or alternatively reissue the majority opinion with
the two errors corrected.
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POINT THREE
THE MAJORITY OPINIONfS REASONING FAILS TO ADEQUATELY
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PLAINTIFF'S STATUS AS A "MEMBER" OF
CACHE VALLEY ASSOCIATION AND AS A "MILK PRODUCER" AND
THUS MISAPPREHENDS A FUNDAMENTAL AND WELL-ESTABLISHED
DISTINCTION IN COOPERATIVE LAW.
Because

the Respondent, Cache Valley

Dairy Association,

operates as a cooperative under Title 3, Utah Code Annotated, the
Plaintiff, Theon Merrill, occupies two separate and distinct
legal relationships with the Association.

It is respectfully

submitted that the majority errs in its legal analysis by failing
to treat the termination of the "independent
producer"

contract

relationship

separately

contractor-milk

from

that

of the

termination under the bylaws of the "membership" relationship.
Although this analogy may not be perfect, it appears that
the majority opinion ignores the termination of the Plaintiff
under the contractual relationship and keys solely on the May
2 6th resolution.
analysis

the

Because the majority opinion merges in its

rights

and

obligations

under

these

separate

relationships, it would appear that there is an unstated premise
which has not been

fully tested

for its correctness.

For

example, if one were to argue that Notre Dame is a Catholic
Institution and conclude therefrom that all those who attend
Notre Dame are Catholics one would be falsely assuming that the
only students registered

at Notre Dame are Catholic! students, a ~my
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i

premise

which

is

false.

Similarly

to

conclude

that

the

Association cannot have rights of termination regarding the "milk
contract" with its "milk suppliers" which are broader than the
Association's rights to terminate the "membership" relationship
is

to

assume

without

stating

clearly

that

the

rights

and

obligations of the parties and the two positions they occupy to
one another are not separate or distinct, but are the same.
is respectfully submitted that this is a serious fallacy.

It

Since

there are very few opinions regarding this subject matter upon
which one can obtain guidance, it would seem imperative for this
Court to issue a well reasoned opinion, since this is likely to
become a controlling case on future cooperative law.
Title 3 UCA clearly delineates and maintains a distinction
between the

"member" relationship

and the

"milk supplier or

producer" relationship which a milk producer occupies.
grants

Cache

(separate

Valley

from

the

status

its members) and

of

a

separate

Title 3

legal

sets out specific

entity'

statutory

prov sions required for the bylaws of the organization which
control

the

provisions

"membership" relationship
which

control

the

"milk

and

separate

supplier"

relationship.

or

statutory
"producer"
V

As a "member" of the Association, the Plaintiff Merrill and
Cache Valley Dairy have certain rights and obligations vis a visone another.

The Plaintiff is entitled to one vote; as a member'
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of the Cooperative.

As a "member" he was also entitled to share

in the profits of the Association based on his patronage of the
Association.

In addition, as a "member" he was given certain

protection underneath the bylaws as well as Title 3 itself, which
protections are specifically established and operate in his favor
in his capacity as a "member" of the Association.
As a "producer" or an "independent contractor-supplier of
milk" to the cooperative, the Plaintiff Merrill and Cache Valley
Dairy have other (additional) rights and obligations vis a vis
one another.

In his capacity as a "milk producer," Plaintiff

Merrill was required to ship milk meeting minimum state health
quality standards (i.e. bacteria free) capable of being utilized
in the Association's production facilities to produce quality
dairy products.
contractually

As a "milk producer," the Plaintiff Merrill was
required

to

meet

certain

health

laws

and

regulations set up regarding the cleanliness of his dairy herd
and facilities as well as other contractual obligations.

As a

milk producer, the Plaintiff Merrill received a price for his
milk which was set on a market rate.

This price was set

independently of any amount of retainage which the Plaintiff
Merrill would receive as a "member," i.e. from future contingent
profits of the Association.
Merrill

occupied

contractor-supplier

the

As a "milk producer," the Plaintiff-v"-^--

legal

relationship

of milk to

Cache Valley

of

an

Dairy.

9
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independent
If during £'-•••

the course of some farming operation Plaintiff Merrill committed
a tortious harm to a third party, the third party would have no
right

to

proceed

against

the

assets

of

Cache Valley

Dairy

Association, since the Association is not a partnership, but is a
separate legal entity.

If during the course of Cache Valley

Dairy's operation it were to injure a third party, the converse
is also true, that the third party could not proceed against the
Plaintiff Merrill as either a member of the Association or as a ~
supplier of milk.

The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that

if this independent contractor-supplier cf milk aspect of the
legal relationship is ignored or merged in the analysis of the
rights and obligations of the Association to Merrill and Merrill
to the Association under the "membership11 relationship that the
legal analysis is needlessly contaminated.
It would appear that the majority opinion contains within it
an unstated premise, i.e. that the legal relationship of the
Plaintiff

Merrill

as a

"member11

as well

as a

"producer or

independent supplier of milk" are merged and are not legally
different nor do they need to be treated separately and thus, it
is respectfully submitted, becomes flawed.

The Association would

respectfully submit that its rights to terminate a producer's
contract under the contract terms are broader than the majority ^ ^
recognizes applying

their merged analysis.

The mindrity opinion rt-c
l
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appears to have grasped this distinction which the majority
opinion ignores.

It is respectfully submitted that since the

opinion will become one of the leading cases in the area of state
cooperative law that the analysis and logic which the Court
applies to arrive at its conclusions should be clearly stated.

CONCLUSION
If the opinion remains in its present form, it could lead to
a mass exodus of members from the Association (which they have a
right to withdraw from between June 1 and June 10 each year as
permitted

under

their membership

contract) which will

greater damage to the Cache Valley Dairy.
irreparable

harm

to

the Association

elected to withdraw.
The

undersigned

respectfully

This could cause

if the
* ?

cause

.

Idaho producers
j

requests

the

Court

to

reconsider its decision in this matter and if the conclusion
remains the same, then in the alternative, that the portion
relating

to the

resolution and the effects of disparity be

eliminated from the decision as there are sufficient grounds that
the Court could sustain its decision and not cause additional
harm to the dairy that the opinion
expected to cause. • ,;

in its present form is
-

=-••.:«*.•.::..
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of January, 1988.
j

...

HARRIS, PRESTON, CHAMBERS, & WILLMORE

i

.. A . .

, ,.

"

*3>

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Cache

:ss.
)

B.H. Harris and Joseph M. Chambers, counsel for the Cache
Valley Dairy Association, hereby certify that they have read the
above and foregoing Petition for Rehearing and certify that the
said petition is presented in good faith and not for delay and
that the same is made for the purpose of correcting erroneous
conclusions which were overlooked or misapprehended by the
majority opinion of the Court which misconstrued certain facts in
the case as set forth above. That it is imperative the opinion
if published, be correct factually so conclusions will be based
upon correct facts.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 5th day of
January, 1988, ten copies of the foregoing brief were filed with
the Clerk of the Supreme Court and that on said date, the
undersigned mailed four copies of the foregoing to William L.
Schultz, attorney for the Plaintiff and Appellant, 1061 East 2100
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
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